




















A REFLECTION ON PHILOSOPHY, MYTH, AND SCIENCE
W. J. Korab-Karpowicz
What is philosophy? What is myth? What
is science? None of these questions can eas-
ily be answered. Different philosophical
schools define philosophy in accordance
with their various philosophical standpoints.
The numerous traditional stories to which
the term “myth” is commonly applied cover
an enormous area, so that it may be mistaken
to look for some general definition of all
myths. Some scientists maintain that there is
no single category “science” and that a gen-
eral characterization of science cannot be es-
tablished.
The purpose of this essay is to establish a
relationship between philosophy, myth, and
science in reference to a historical perspec-
tive. If for methodological reasons we now
disregard the above mentioned terminologi-
cal difficulties and refer to a common-sense
view of myth, philosophy, and science, it re-
mains unquestionable that myth existed long
before philosophy and modern science be-
gan as late as the seventeenth century. Never-
theless, this historical perspective is not in-
troduced to affirm the positivistic view,
according to which the history of humanity
should be described in terms of three stages:
theological (mythical), metaphysical (philo-
sophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it
presented to say that the positive one repre-
sents the final achievement of the human
race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show
that by departing from myth and original
philosophy, modern men and women have
concealed from themselves an intensely rich
experience of life. In order to regain the love
of wisdom, we need first to look backwards
in order to move forward.
Myth and Its Dimensions
To some scholars myths are simply the
imaginative products of a primitive mind.
They are traditional stories, the narratives
that are told in archaic, non-literate societies.
To others, myths are sacred tales, revelatory
and exemplary, because they are either literal
or symbolic representations of reality and
determine exemplary models of human ac-
tions. It is acknowledged that myths consti-
tute a very complex and at the same time un-
certain category.1 I will propose a definition
that will at least in part pay tribune to the
complexity of myth: myth is a wholeness at-
tuned to the world as a whole and disclosing
the world in its completeness. In order to
make this statement more clear, I need first to
explain what I call “mythical attitude.”
“Mythical attitude” is an expression by
which I characterize the way in which a
member of a mythical archaic society relates
to the world. It is commonly agreed upon
that for the archaic human being the world is
not what it is for us today. For archaic men
and women the world as a whole is “thou.”2
The world is unique and has an unprece-
dented character of a person, or even of a rel-
ative. Nature is the manifestation of the di-
vine and is revered. Winds, rivers,
headlands, mountains, springs, and animals
are all personified and become subjects of
myths. The natural world is permeated by
forces which are depicted in divine and hu-
man terms. A member of a mythical society
does not feel separated from, but rather en-
gaged with, the world. “Thou” is not intel-
lectually reflected upon, but experienced as
life meeting life.3 Mythical attitude is thus
one that can be best characterized by the
word “engagement.” Further, it is neither the
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attitude of a rational, disinterested observer
nor of a self-interested hedonist, which can
both be attributed to the modern individual.
It is also not the attitude of a believer, based
on faith.4 It is rather the attitude of an en-
gaged devotee or lover.
Whether it is about the creation of the
world, an animal, or an institution, a myth
narrates something as if it would really hap-
pen. For the archaic human being myths are
true stories that concern themselves with re-
alities.5 Consequently, the world as “thou”
reveals itself in myth firstly as a cosmologi-
cal representation in which supernatural
powers, miracles, and gods are believed to
truly exist. This representation is real and sa-
cred, but it is not objective. Being objective
presupposes an attitude of an indifferent,
neutral, and impartial observer, which is not
the mythical attitude. The cosmological rep-
resentation of myth is based on devotional
engagement. For archaic men and women,
nature or the world as a whole is not an ob-
ject, but something magic, alive, and divine.
This cosmological representation, which in-
volves supernatural powers, is neither objec-
tive nor based on faith, but is taken literally
by virtue of engaged devotion. However, as
soon as humans lose their devotional en-
gagement with the world, the cosmological
representation may become invalid for them.
They can “objectively” disprove the exis-
tence of “thou” and all supernatural phenom-
ena.
Myth, the result of the revelation of
“thou,” is always a whole. It is not created
part by part. It is not a product of discursive
or inductive reasoning. The ecstasy, the su-
preme mystical experience of the revelation,
takes one beyond the realms of the sensorial
and rational.6 The sudden revelation may re-
veal the world as it is as a whole in a myth. It
is the experience of existence in its totality
which can manifest the sacred and introduce
new meaningful patterns upon man’s life and
his world. When I say that myth is a whole-
ness attuned to the world as a whole, I mean
firstly that myth, the result of the revelation
of the world as a whole, is completed as a
whole already at its beginning by one who is
the divine knower, the mystic, the inspired
shaman, the godlike mortal, its receiver and
creator. It is completed already at the begin-
ning; and yet, it evolves. But it evolves as
slowly as mythological society develops;
that is, very slowly in comparison to the de-
velopment of modern society. We can simply
acknowledge that myth’s evolution proceeds
from revelation to revelation. It can be stimu-
lated by those few—the mystics—who
would prove themselves to be divine
knowers and who would understand the lay-
ers of meaning which constitute the whole-
ness of myth.
Myths are not simple and uniform. They
are often multidimensional, endowed with
different emphases and levels of meanings.
A myth does not have mostly a fixed mean-
ing, but a number of them. “Myth, like sym-
bol, has its own particular ‘logic,’ its own in-
trinsic consistency which enables it to be
‘true’ on a variety of planes.”7 When I say
that myth is a wholeness, I also mean all the
levels or layers of meaning that can be found
in myth constitute a wholeness and myths do
not yield to one particular, partial interpreta-
tion. What is whole cannot be justifiably re-
duced to any of its parts. Yet the different lev-
els of meaning can be discovered. Their
discovery corresponds to what can be called
an expansion of one’s understanding or spiri-
tual growth. Myths are sacred tales, revela-
tory and exemplary, because they reveal the
structure of reality to the archaic human be-
ing and supply him with exemplary models
for his actions. They validate every custom
and institution of a mythological society.8
But, as he grows spiritually, a member of a
mythical society, the shaman or mystic is
able to understand new meanings which are
revealed to him in myth. Understanding is
not a mere intellectual or theoretical cate-
gory here. Initiated into new planes on which
“thou” is revealed in myth, archaic man re-
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sponds by way of his behavior and by his be-
ing.
The world as “thou” is a life presence
whose qualities can be articulated because
the “thou” can reveal itself. Humanity origi-
nal experiences in meeting this “thou”—the
experiences of existence in its totality which
reveal to men and women the meaning of
their being in the world—are conveyed in
myths. Myth perpetuates the revelation of
the “thou.” The purpose of many myths is to
revoke, re-establish, or to re-enact the cre-
ative era in which the original meeting of hu-
mans and the “thou” took place. The original
experiences that lay at the origin of myths
can thus be reclaimed. These experiences are
contained in different levels or layers of
meanings that can be discovered in myth,
and thus, recovered. Through the interpreta-
tion of the cosmological representation of
myth which is mostly symbolic, the human
being can regain an understanding of himself
in the world. He can disclose the meaning of
his being, which is the human-being-in-this-
world, as well as the meaning of myth as
such. When I say that myth is a wholeness
disclosing the world in its completeness, I
mean that myth is a certain interpretative
unit, a unity of its different meanings that can
be recovered and that can lead us back to the
original experiences of humans meeting the
world as a whole as “thou.”
From Myth to Philosophy
Even if we accept that myths are results of
the revelation of a “thou” and are often
founded upon an original experience that
reaches beyond the sensorial and rational,
we can still maintain that they are not illogi-
cal. They are indeed mostly susceptible to ra-
tional analysis and logical interpretation. An
analysis of many myths would show that ac-
tions of gods and heroes often presuppose a
keen analysis of given circumstances and are
based on rational decisions.9 At least we can
say that some myths represent complex logi-
cal systems that are different from those that
are usually found in contemporary Western
societies. Yet, according to a common view,
there is a radical separation between muthos
and logos, between myth and philosophy.
Myth is associated with the mysterious and
illogical, and philosophy with the rational
and logical. Myths are part of a way of life
and state precedence and models for human
actions, but unlike philosophy they do not
seek to explain them on a rational basis.
Myths use images; philosophy, concepts.
Philosophy asks generalized questions, re-
lies on systematic reasoning, and rejects the
supernatural explanations of the world, but
myths are usually confined to a particular
mythological society, are unsystematic and
deal with the sacred.
The beginning of philosophy is not the re-
sult of one brief shining moment of a sudden
discovery of a rational, philosophical mind.
Only on a very superficial interpretation are
myths illogical and deprived of rational
thinking. The emergence of philosophy in
Greece was preceded by the rationalizing
and systematizing of myths, such as we can
find, for example, in Hesiod’s Theogony.10
The process by which myth gave way to phi-
losophy is thus far from straightforward, ex-
tending over several centuries. Nevertheless,
there are two aspects of this process that re-
fer to the decadence of Greek myths and
they, I believe, are the key to understanding
the origin of philosophy.
The first aspect refers to the fact that
myths do not only naturally evolve, but also
are liable to undergo dramatic changes,
caused especially by a foreign conquest and
a sudden intrusion of a foreign mythology.
Such a dramatic change may have occurred
between the nineteenth and sixteenth cen-
tury B.C. when Bronze Age tribes invaded
Greece and brought with them a new reli-
gion. The early Greek deities were many, im-
manent and manifest in nature. Nature was
the manifestation of the divine. The princi-
pal deity was the Mother Goddess or Mother
Earth. With the arrival of the invaders, the
principal deity becomes the god-man Zeus.
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In archaic societies every significant ac-
tion, including war, has a precedence in a
mythical, exemplary model, and conse-
quently takes place in the sacred time.11 Zeus
personifies and sets a precedence for the
king of an ancient community, a just and
wise ruler. In fact, as long the king rules in
conformity with Nature, he is the Divine
King, the mighty, revered guardian of har-
mony and order. Nature is still revered. The
Divine King protects life. He marries the
Mother Goddess of the local community.
But with social development, which makes
the communities larger, more self-sufficient
and independent, the king becomes the sym-
bol of might that can overcome the powers of
nature. In the mythical war between the ca-
pricious forces of nature symbolized by Ti-
tans and the gods under the leadership of
Zeus, the god-man is the winner. Conse-
quently, it is he rather than nature who be-
comes feared and revered. The profane, fac-
tual acts thus gain the upper hand over the
exemplary and mythical. The separation be-
tween the human being and “thou” begins.
The Greek myths show that the original rela-
tionship of devotional engagement between
humans and the “thou,” which is the founda-
tion of mythical attitude, is, by the time of
Homer and Hesiod, already seriously weak-
ened.
In a mythical society there are two kinds
of events that take place in time.12 First are
those that can be called sacred and take place
in a sacred time because they find their vali-
dation or confirmation in myths. The second
are those that follow no exemplary pattern
and can be called profane. One of the most
important functions of myth is to provide ex-
emplary models for all significant human ac-
tions, to validate customs and institutions.
However, in Greece in the sixth century
B.C., when western philosophy is born,
myth can no longer satisfactorily perform
this function. Once the separation between
humans and the “thou” is initiated, the voli-
tional, aesthetic, and other profane elements
enter into myth. This in fact happens to the
Greek mythology largely because of Homer
and Hesiod. The classical mythology of
Homer and Hesiod represents the triumph of
the literary work against myth. The gods
whom both Homer and Hesiod describe are
not only divine, but also show their undis-
guised human faces. They are moved by pas-
s ions and commit abuses . When
Xenophanes and later Plato accuse these
great poets of attributing to the gods all the
things which are shameful, they address an
audience that is already convinced. These
ancient critics of classical mythology do not
argue against religion or myth as such, but in
the name of a higher idea of the divine they
attack the shameful behavior of the gods as
depicted by the poets. To sum up, the second
important aspect of the process by which
myth gave way to philosophy is the fact that
Greek myths gradually lost their function as
exemplary models for human actions and af-
flicted Greece with a religious and moral
vacuum.
The Beginning of Philosophy
Many scholars perceive, perhaps rightly,
something unique in the development of
Greek philosophy. It is a widely spread opin-
ion that Thales and his successors ask gen-
eral questions about the world and propose
general, rational answers that are no longer
based on theological considerations. The
Presocratic thinkers are believed to be not
only the first philosophers, but also the first
empirical scientists.13 For Husserl, the ratio-
nality and generality of both their questions
and answers is a sign of a theoretical attitude,
which is the basis of science and which can
be sharply contrasted with a practical atti-
tude that refers to myth.14 It is not my purpose
to argue that some of these views may be
misleading. In his book on The Nature of
Greek Myths, Kirk shows that Thales,
Anaximenes, and Anaximander continued
to be strongly affected by mythical precon-
ceptions, and their cosmologies were based
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on the theogonical models provided by
myths.15 My fundamental claim is that the
way of inquiry that philosophy initiates is
primarily the consequence of the decadence
of Greek myths. In the initial stage of the de-
velopment of philosophy, at least some phi-
losophers try to make up for the loss that the
corruption of myths brings about. From this
point of view, there is no radical break in
continuity between myth and philosophy.
By the time of the first philosophers,
Greek myths, corrupted by the poets, do not
provide humans with exemplary models for
right conduct. They become bad stories. For
Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Plato, and
other Greek philosophers, the classical myth
no longer performs its function, but becomes
a source of confusion. We can find a striking
confirmation of this statement in books II
and III of the Republic where Plato openly
criticizes Homer and Hesiod for teaching
falsehoods and for giving bad images of
what gods and heroes are like. The gods and
heroes of Hesiod and Homer can no longer
supply men and women with models for
their behavior. The human being loses his
devotional engagement with the world. In-
stead of following the ways prescribed by
myth, men and women now choose poets
and humans to be their teachers. Unable to
undergo a deeper mystical experience, they
are now deceived by appearances, the visible
things. Heraclitus says:
For what thought or understanding have
they? They follow the poets and take the
crowd as their teachers, knowing that there
are many bad and few good (fr. 104). Men
are deceived over the recognition of visible
things, in the same way as Homer, who was
the wisest of all the Hellenes (fr. 56).
Homer deserves to be turned out of the lists
and whipped. (fr. 43)16
For the human being who loses his devo-
tional engagement with the world, the origi-
nal cosmological representation of myth be-
comes gradually invalid. He “objectively”
disproves the existence of the “thou.” He
may still listen to myths, but for aesthetic or
literary reasons. He becomes indifferent to
Nature, and regards everything merely as an
object of either his inquiry or exploitation.
He becomes a self-seeking individual. When
looking at the sea, he does not perceive Po-
seidon nor his horses. Myth becomes a fool-
ish fantasy and is no longer valid for him.
The first Greek philosophers attempt to
prevent their contemporaries from losing
their engagement with the world. Their con-
temporaries lose their devotional engage-
ment because of the corruption of the classi-
cal myth. Therefore, philosophy needs to
replace myth in ancient Greece. Its function
at the early stage is still similar to that of
myth. By providing a representation of real-
ity, philosophy reveals the meaning of the
whole and directs human behavior. For the
Milesians, the world is still alive and divine;
it is a “thou.” For Thales water is arche, the
unity and the origin of the living presence.
Water makes things grow. It supports the
growth and unceasing process of life.
Anaximenes says that the original element,
arche, is not water, but air. It is clear that he
does not consider air merely as physical mat-
ter. Rather, for him air is also connected with
the maintenance of life. It is an agent of vital-
ity. Anaximander objected to the idea of a
single, determinate constituent of our world
being the original element. He is apparently
the least understood among the Milesians.
Anaximander declares arche to be apeirion
(something indeterminate, inexhaustible,
and indefinite). What he appears to say is
that our beginning and end are not known to
us. Anaximander reflects upon the very fact
of human-being-in-the-world. We rise from
chaos and go back to chaos. What is between
is cosmos, the precious life. Further,
Anaximander expresses the idea of a righ-
teous universe when he says that things “pay
penalty and retribution to each other for the
injustice according to the assessment of
time” (fr. 1). Nature for him is not only alive,
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but like a person, it is moral and subjected to
moral laws.
If we define scientists as those who at-
tempt to describe the world “objectively” in
terms of abstract principles and explain it by
general laws, Milesians were certainly not
scientists. For them the world is alive and di-
vine, it is “thou.” They inquire into the world
as a whole, and desire to know the whole, but
such a knowledge postulates an engagement
with the whole and not an “objective,” theo-
retical description. The engagement of the
Milesians, and also of subsequent philoso-
phers, including Plato and Aristotle, can be
traced to the etymology of the word “philos-
ophy” itself. In the proper sense of this word,
“philosophy,” “love of wisdom” presup-
poses being engaged, the attitude of a lover,
and not being indifferent. The philosophical
attitude of first philosophers is thus still en-
gagement. By contrast to mythological atti-
tude it is not devotional, but rather affective
engagement. The stress is no longer put on
the supernatural, but rather on the pursuit of
the knowledge of the whole and on under-
standing. It is true that by interpreting them
in terms of his theory of four causes, already
Aristotle misrepresents the cosmological
representations of the Milesians. Further
misinterpretations are obvious if we notice
the word phusis (Nature) is often translated
as “the real constitution” and the word arche
by such terms as “substance” or “principle.”
But the Milesians are first philosophers, the
lovers, they are not empirical scientists.
Objectivity and the
Scientific Attitude
For the modern man of science, the phe-
nomenal world is primarily an “It,” an object
of observation and experiment. According to
a perhaps naive, but still prevailing
positivistic account of science, science is ob-
jective.17 It derives its objectivity from the
objectivity of observation. The way in which
scientists look at the world is sometimes de-
scribed as “scientific attitude.” In order to be
objective observers, scientists must be indif-
ferent, disinterested, neutral, and impartial.18
Personal opinions or preferences have to be
suspended. No subjective elements are al-
lowed to intrude. Further, the objectivity of
observation is the basis of science’s reliabil-
ity. Science is believed to be reliable if it is
based on objective, observational statements
that can then be transmitted into laws and
theories.
One of the key characteristics of modern
science is objectivity. Objective, scientific
knowledge is held to be independent of the
human mind that either creates or under-
stands it. But just as scientific knowledge,
derived from observation, presupposes the
scientific attitude of being an indifferent ob-
server, so also its verification and sharing
with other members of the scientific commu-
nity requires the same attitude. Without this
attitude science would neither be objective
nor inter-subjective. Objectivity and scien-
tific attitude are thus interrelated. If this,
however, is truly the case, objective knowl-
edge is not independent of the human mind
as it is commonly believed. It is dependent
upon the states of mind that constitute scien-
tific attitude: on being indifferent, disinter-
ested, neutral and impartial. While defend-
ing objectivity in science Karl Popper says:
My . . . thesis involves the existence of two
different senses of knowledge or of
thought: (1) knowledge or thought in the
subjective sense, consisting of a state of
mind or of consciousness or a disposition
to behave or to act, and (2) knowledge or
thought in an objective sense, consisting of
problems, theories, and arguments as
such.19
Popper radically distinguishes “objective”
theories, problems, and arguments from
“subjective” states of mind. But once we
comprehend that objectivity in science pre-
supposes scientific attitude as its foundation,
we can no longer accept that objective scien-
tific knowledge is free from subjectivity.
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Objective theory is not independent of the
human mind.
Being indifferent, disinterested, neutral,
and impartial can be contrasted with being
engaged. The scientific attitude of a modern
empirical scientist lies thus in direct opposi-
tion to the mythological attitude, and also to
the philosophical attitude, if we understand
philosophy traditionally as the love of wis-
dom. If the scientific attitude seems emo-
tionally neutral, both the mythological and
philosophical attitudes are based on feelings,
whether those are feelings of devotion, com-
passion, or the love of humanity and alive na-
ture. But indifference, a lack of feeling, is a
state of mind as well. There is subjectivity in
scientific objectivity, namely, indifference.
Science looks at the world “objectively,” in-
differently as if it were an object, but in fact
the world is not that. To look at the world as
an object is a way of relating to it from a cer-
tain perspective and can in fact bring about
only its abstraction. This is not the way to
know the world as a whole. Science replaces
“thou,” the life presence, with the dead world
of abstracted objects.
Philosophy Rediscovered
The fact that there is a continuity between
myth and philosophy that makes early phi-
losophy look more similar to myth than to
modern science does not mean that there are
not significant differences between myth
and philosophy. I wish to explore two dis-
tinctions that I believe to be fundamental.
First, myth is a wholeness disclosing the
world in its completeness. It signifies wis-
dom, the knowledge of the whole. But, al-
ready at its early stage, instead of being wis-
dom, philosophy is rather a pursuit of
wisdom, the desire to arrive at the ultimate
knowledge of everything, at the knowledge
of the whole. Second, mythical attitude pre-
supposes engagement with the world as a
whole of which myth is itself a part. The cos-
mological representation in myth is founded
on devotional engagement. “Objectively”
taken, myth may be seen as a foolish or fan-
tastic story, but thus rationalized it does not
lead us to the knowledge of the whole. It
does not reveal the levels or layers of mean-
ings which can be discovered in it. But a sys-
tem of philosophy is founded on affective
rather than devotional engagement. It can be
taken as on object of an examination. This
happens in fact already at the beginning of
philosophy. Anaximenes says that arche is
not water but air. Thus, he is certainly not de-
votionally engaged with Thales’ system.
Early philosophy appears to have almost the
same function as myth: philosophy reveals
the meaning of the whole and directs human
behavior. Yet, it is also already essentially
different from myth. It does not claim the
knowledge of the whole and does not posit
devotional engagement toward itself.
Myth is a wholeness attuned to the world
as a whole because those who live in myth
and are guided by it are engaged on many
different planes with the whole of which the
myth is an integral part. By teaching humans
and by regulating the way of their living in
devotional engagement with the whole and
by gradually disclosing many layers of its
meaning, myth reveals the knowledge of the
whole. But the knowledge of the whole is not
merely theoretical. It is not merely a partial,
intellectual knowledge. It embraces the
whole of life. Myth reveals the knowledge
for which philosophy in a proper sense
looks. But it does not disclose this knowl-
edge without appropriate devotional engage-
ment. Myth is completed already at the be-
ginning, whereas philosophy seeks to be
completed at the end. Mythical societies live
in eternity rather than in historical time. The
societies in which philosophy or science
plays an important part constantly seek their
completion and are in a permanent dissatis-
faction with the results of their findings.
They live in history and are time oriented.
Myth corresponds to eternity, philosophy to
the discovery of history.
If myth is taken “objectively” its cosmo-
logical representation may no longer make
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any sense. If a philosophy is subjected to an
objective examination, it may perhaps be re-
jected, but it does not become senseless. The
fact that philosophy may be objectively ex-
amined and therefore challenged contributes
to both its development and decline. On the
one hand, it develops into a rich conceptual
and intellectual framework as a result of a
great debate between contending world
views, different schools and philosophical
systems that has taken place in the history of
philosophy. On the other hand, it declines
because it finally ceases to be pursuit of wis-
dom and largely dissolves into sciences. The
scient i fic paradigm, especial ly the
positivistic one, transforms philosophy. It re-
duces philosophy to an exercise in language
analysis, and deprives the rest of it of the
right to exist. It also reduces the human being
to a self-interested, self-seeking and thus ra-
tionalized individual, moved solely by his
passions. Philosophy loses its original sense
and, like science, becomes partial knowl-
edge of a part. But I shall not immerse myself
any further in the issue of the decadence of
philosophy. I wish now to show how philoso-
phy already at its beginning was doomed to
decline, and how to regain the love of wis-
dom.
Philosophy defined as pursuit of wisdom
can be understood as the desire to arrive at
ultimate knowledge—the knowledge of the
whole, but it neither is the knowledge of the
whole nor does it posit devotional engage-
ment toward itself. It can be subjected to a
critical, objective, or even unsympathetic ex-
amination. Hence, there is a lack of conse-
quence in and a danger to philosophy as
such: philosophy is the love of wisdom,
which presupposes affective engagement
with the world, but it may be rejected by an
indifferent or cynic sophist. In the long run,
philosophy, which in its original form tries to
make up for the loss that the corruption of
myths brings about, had no chance of sur-
vival, like myth. In order to persevere, it had
to develop two survival techniques. First, in
philosophers like Heraclitus, Plato, Hegel,
and Heidegger, it developed highly ambigu-
ous language and nonpenetrable esoteric
content. Second, in philosophers like Aris-
totle, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl it aimed
at becoming scientific and thus at establish-
ing an unshaken ground on which it could
protect itself from possible criticism. In both
cases the goal was the same: defense against
the profane. When we carefully examine the
basic ideas of some highly sophisticated and
publicly admired philosophical writings, we
can often discover their poverty. The form
overcomes the actual content. When we
carefully examine some simple myths of so
called primitive people, with great surprise
we can discover ideas of key importance to
our lives. The content overcomes the form.
I would say that the contemporary eso-
teric stream in philosophy, even if it still in-
spires many doctoral and master’s theses,
has become today very problematic, espe-
cially in its post-modern version; whereas
the scientific stream has contributed consid-
erably to the decline of original philosophiz-
ing, especially in its positivistic and analytic
versions. In the proper sense, philosophy is
the love of wisdom; pursuit of the knowledge
of the whole. But when it turns to be scien-
tific and attempts to look at the world “objec-
tively,” that is, as if it were an object, it ar-
rives only at the partial knowledge of a part.
What remains largely unquestioned in mod-
ern science is its essence. The essence of sci-
entific outlook is indifference. Science re-
gards the world indifferently as an object of
scientific research. Consequently, philoso-
phy needs to follow its own path. Philosophy
should not look at things as if they were just
objects. It needs to recognize the illusion
which the partial knowledge brings about. In
the proper sense, philosophy as the love of
wisdom presupposes being engaged with the
world and not being indifferent.
This essay is not intended to provide easy
answers to problems that are immense. Even
if we do like to think about this, we are prob-
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ably all aware of our present human condi-
tion. As in the Greece of Xenophanes,
Heraclitus, and Plato there are still temples,
but merely as something that reminds us of
the past. Corrupted and weakened religion
does not teach today’s men and women to
live in engagement with the world. Human
vices and wicked ideas take the place of gods
and become prized. For this reason philoso-
phy arises: to reveal the meaning of the
whole, to direct human behavior, and ulti-
mately to prevent humans from destruction.
But it fails. Perhaps it is true that it is “too late
for God and too early for being.” Perhaps it is
now either too late or too early to ask God to
save us. Perhaps we can once more try the
way of original philosophy that is the love of
wisdom. But in such a case we have to avoid
our old mistake. To place the world before us
as an object of indifferent investigation can
lead the world to be known only as an ab-
stracted object and not as a whole. Under the
surface of illusion that results from such in-
vestigation there is a universal knowledge
that arises from our devotional and affective
engagement with the world.
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